The PBoC's monetary supremacy over Brazil (but don't blame the Chinese)

The PBoC's monetary supremacy over Brazil (but don't blame the Chinese)
Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega likes to blame the Federal Reserve (and the US in general) for most evils in the Brazilian economy and he has claimed that the fed has waged a 'currency war' on Emerging Market nations. As my loyal readers know I think that it makes very little sense to talk about a currency war and  I strongly believe that any nation with free floating exchange rates is in full control of monetary conditions in the country and hence of both the price level and nominal GDP. However, here the key is a freely floating exchange rate. Hence, a country with a fixed exchange rate - like Hong Kong or Denmark - will "import" the monetary policy from the country its currency is pegged to - the case of Hong Kong to the US and in the case of Denmark to the euro zone. In reality few countries in the world have fully freely floating exchange rates. Hence, as I argued in my previous post on Turkey many - if not most - central banks suffers from fear-of-floating. This means that these central banks effectively will at least to some extent let other central banks determine their monetary policy. So to some extent Mantega is right - the fed does in fact have a great impact on the monetary conditions in most countries in the world, but this is because that the national central banks refuse to let their currencies float completely freely. There is a trade off between control of the currency and monetary sovereignty. You cannot have both - at least not with free capital movement. From Chinese M1 to Brazilian NGDP   Guido Mantega's focus on the Federal Reserve might, however, be wrong. He should instead focus on another central bank - the People Bank of China (PBoC). By a bit of a coincidence I discovered the following relationship - shown in the graph below. China M3 Brazil NGDP What is the graph telling us? Well, it looks like the growth of the Chinese money supply (M1) has caused the growth of Brazilian nominal GDP - at least since 2000. This might of course be a completely spurious correlation, but bare with me for a while. I think I am on to something here. Obviously we should more or less expect this relationship if the Brazilian central bank had been pegging the Brazilian real to the Chinese renminbi, but we of course all know that that has not been the case. The Chinese-Brazilian monetary transmission mechanism So what is the connection between Chinese and Brazilian monetary conditions? First of all since 2008-9 China has been Brazil's biggest trading partner. Brazil is primarily exporting commodities to China. This means that easier Chinese monetary policy likely will spur Brazilian exports. Second, easier Chinese monetary policy will also push up global commodity prices as China is the biggest global consumer of a number of different commodities. With commodity prices going up Brazil's export to other countries than China will also increase. Therefore, as Chinese monetary easing will be a main determinant of Brazilian exports we should expect the Brazilian real to strengthen. However, if the Brazilian central bank (and government) has a fear-of-floating the real will not be allowed to strengthen nearly as much as would have been the case under a completely freely floating exchange rate regime.Therefore, effectively the Brazilian central bank will at least partly import changes in monetary conditions from China. As a result the Brazilian authorities has - knowingly or unknowingly - left its monetary sovereignty to the People's Bank of China. The guy in control of Brazil's monetary conditions is not Ben Bernanke, but PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan, but don't blame him. It is not his fault. It is the result of the Brazilian authorities' fear-of-floating. The latest example - a 50bp rate hike Recently the tightening of Chinese monetary conditions has been in the headlines in the global media. Therefore, if my hypothesis about the Chinese-Brazlian monetary transmission is right then tighter Chinese monetary conditions should trigger Brazilian monetary tightening. This of course is exactly what we are now seeing. The latest example we got on Wednesday when the Brazilian central bank hiked its key policy rates - the SELIC rate - by 50bp to 8.50%. Hence, the Brazilian central bank is doing exactly the opposite than one should have expected. Shouldn't a central bank ease rather than tighten monetary policy when the country's main trading partner is seeing growth slowing significantly? Why import monetary tightening in a situation where export prices are declining and market growth is slowing? Because of the fear-of-floating. Yes, Brazilian inflation has increased significantly if you look at consumer prices, but this is primarily a result of higher import prices (and other supply side factors) due to a weaker currency rather than stronger aggregate demand. In fact it is pretty clear that aggregate demand (and NGDP) growth is slowing significantly. The central bank is hence reacting to a negative supply shock (higher import prices) and ignoring the negative demand shock. Obviously, it is deeply problematic that the Brazilian authorities effectively have given up monetary sovereignty to the PBoC - and it is very clear that macroeconomic volatility is much higher as a result. The solution is obviously for the Brazilian authorities to get over the fear-of-floating and allowing the Brazilian real to float much more freely in the same way has for example the Reserve Bank of Australia is doing.


WORLD LEADING ADVISORY SPECIALISING IN THIS TOPIC

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