ALL BLOG POSTS
I am increasingly realising that a key problem in the Market Monetarist arguments for NGDP level targeting is that we have not been very clear in our arguments concerning how it would actually work.
The fears of economists and politicians with regard to flexible exchange rates can largely be traced back to the policies of the 1920s following the collapse of the gold standard. The most famous criticism of flexible exchange rates is probably that made by the Estonian economist Ragnar Nurkse. Nurkse claimed that the 1920s demonstrated that flexible exchange rates are destabilising.
In a post today Scott Sumner pays tribute to Bennett McCallum. I am as Scott is a big fan of Dr. McCallum (and of Scott).
The momentum for NGDP targeting is clearly building. Anybody who is interested in monetary policy and in what will be driving the global market sentiment going forward should have a look this issue.
Only two major countries - China and Spain - were not on the Gold Standard at the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. As a consequence both countries avoided the most negative consequences of the Great Depression. That is a forcefully demonstration of how the "wrong" exchange rate regimes can mean disaster, but also a reminder of Milton Friedman's dictum never to underestimate the importance of luck.
“The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates”
There is no doubt that Milton Friedman is my favourite economist (sorry Scott, you are only number two on the list). In the coming days I will share my interpretation of Friedman’s view of exchange rate policy.